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Abstract—In this work, we focus on the classical optical
channel having Poissonian statistical behavior and propose a
novel secrecy coding-based physical layer protocol. Our protocol
is different but complementary to both (computationally secure)
quantum immune cryptographic protocols and (information the-
oretically secure) quantum cryptographic protocols. Specifically,
our (information theoretical) secrecy coding protocol secures
classical digital information bits at photonic level exploiting the
random nature of the Poisson channel.
It is known that secrecy coding techniques for the Poisson
channel based on the classical one-way wiretap channel (intro-
duced by Wyner in 1975) ensure secret communication only if
the mutual information to the eavesdropper is smaller than that
to the legitimate receiver. In order to overcome such a strong
limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol that always ensures
secret communication independently of the conditions of legiti-
mate and eavesdropper channels. We prove this claim showing
rigorous comparative derivation and analysis of the information
theoretical secrecy capacity of the classical one-way and of the
proposed two-way protocols. We also show numerical calculations
that prove drastic gains and strong practical potential of our
proposed two-way protocol to secure information transmission
over optical channels.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, wiretap capacity, one-
way protocol, two-way protocol, Poisson channel, passive man-
in-the-middle attack
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Rationale and main contributions
Optical carriers are of increasing relevance for both terres-
trial and space applications. For example, 5G communication
includes the use of optical wireless channels as part of cellular
architecture or for backhauling of wireless networks [1], [2],
[3]. Optical links are inherently more secure than carriers in
the radio frequency range while improvements in throughput
are expected to be significant. However, there still exists thread
of eavesdropping under realistic channel conditions, which can
greatly impair the communication due to the high throughputs.
In this work, we focus on the classical optical channel
having Poissonian statistical behavior and propose a secrecy
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coding protocol that secures classical digital information bits
at photonic level exploiting the random nature of the Poisson
channel. It is known that secrecy coding techniques for the
Poisson channel based on the classical one-way wiretap chan-
nel (introduced by Wyner in 1975 [4]) ensures secret commu-
nication only if the mutual information IE to the eavesdropper
is smaller than that IL to the legitimate receiver with a certain
input conditional distribution [5]. Since this condition means
that the positivity of the difference IL− IE with a certain input
conditional distribution, we call it the positive information
difference condition for the wiretap channel.
As a typical and illustrative case, we consider a classical
optical channel from a ground station (the legitimate trans-
mitter) to a satellite (the legitimate receiver). In this case, as
shown in Fig. 1, there is a possibility that a nano-satellite
makes a passive man-in-the-middle attack under the typical
beam divergence of an optical transmission beam. In this case,
the mutual information to the eavesdropper cannot be smaller
than that to the legitimate receiver. Hence, the conventional
one-way wiretap channel coding does not work.
Fig. 1: Example of ground-to-satellite optical communication
scenario where Eve is a nanosatellite not to be detected by
intrusion-detection techniques by neither Alice nor Bob. θdiv
is the divergence angle in radians and d is the distance between
transmitter and receiver. DR is the aperture diameter.
In order to overcome this type of man-in-the-middle attack,
we introduce a two-way protocol that always ensures secret
communication independently of the conditions of legitimate
and eavesdropper Poisson channels. Our two-way protocol
is given as follows. In the first round, one legitimate end
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2sends binary data by the on-off keying (OOK) modulation
to the other legitimate end via a Poisson channel. The later
legitimate applies threshold detection to obtain a binary stream
of data. Since the eavesdropper makes a passive man-in-the-
middle attack, the eavesdropper wiretaps this communication
via another Poisson channel, but cannot modify the Poisson
channel to the latter legitimate. Hence, the noises to these two
channels are assumed to be independent. In the second round,
the latter legitimate end encodes the message to a binary data,
and sends the former legitimate the exclusive or between the
binary data and the binary data obtained in the first round
via a public noiseless channel. The public noiseless channel
is assumed to be perfectly eavesdropped by the eavesdropper,
hence, this model takes the passive man-in-the-middle attack
in the second round into account.
In proving this claim and after a brief review of fundamental
knowledge of the wiretap channel in Section II, we provide a
number of novel contributions structured in the different sec-
tions as follows. In Section III, we present a one-way protocol
for the wiretap Poisson channel, with which we will compare
our proposed two-way protocol. In doing so we first of all
formulate signal model as a function of the average number
of photons received from the physical channel with the OOK
modulation and two types of detectors: threshold detector and
photon number resolving (PNR) detector. Although the latter
was studied in [6], [7], [8] and this model with on-off detector
(a special case of the former) was studied in [9] , this model
with general threshold detector (the general case of the former)
is novel. While the channel degradation conditions are known
for the latter [6], [7], we derive the secrecy capacity and
channel (stochastic and anti-stochastic) degradation conditions
for the former. In addition, for the remaining possible condi-
tions of the channel we obtain the secrecy capacity using the
general formula assuming channel pre-indexing. In Section IV
we present a novel two-way protocol for the wiretap Poisson
channel (following up the protocol for the wiretap Gaussian
channel in [10], [11], which is based on Maurer’s idea [12].).
While the signal model is the same as in the one-way protocol,
there are now two rounds of communications. We show that
in this case Bob always uses threshold detector, but Eve
can use either threshold detector or photon-number-resolving
detection. For all the cases, the secrecy capacity is shown to
be always positive irrespective of the channel conditions of
both the legitimate and the eavesdropper channel. Moreover
it is also analytically shown that the secrecy rate in the two-
way protocol using threshold detector is always not smaller
than the secrecy rate in the one-way protocol. In Section V,
we numerically compare the secrecy capacities of our two-
way protocols with the secrecy capacities of the one-way
protocols. This numerical comparison clarifies how drastically
our two-way protocols improve the one-way protocols. This
improvement shows strong practical potential of our proposed
two-way protocol to secure information transmission over
optical channels.
B. Novelty compared with existing results
The applicability of information theoretical security to en-
hance secret sharing and key agreement over optical links have
been investigated in [13] while outage probability due to laser-
beam divergence and turbulence-induced fading is discussed
in [14]. The paper [6] discussed wiretap Poisson channel only
with one-way protocol, where they assume the PNS detector.
Recently, the paper [9] investigated the OOK modulation
secrecy capacity with the on-off detector in the context of
realistic optical communication. They obtained upper bounds
on the decoding error probability and the leaked information.
Then, they made useful numerical analysis in a realistic setting
with a certain quantum regime. In particular, they clarified the
improvement by use of a pre-index channel in their practical
setting. However, all of these works assume the classical one-
way wiretap channel introduced by Wyner in 1975 [4], which
imposes the well known requirement (the positive information
difference condition) of the relation between the two mutual
informations to the eavesdropper and the legitimate for secrecy
provision [5].
Recently several studies [15], [16], [17], [18] proposed two-
way protocols to overcome the positive information differ-
ence condition. However, they require several communication
rounds. The paper [19] addressed two-way protocol with two
rounds with noisy feedback. The papers [20], [21], [22],
[23], [24] discussed the secrecy capacity with secure noiseless
feedback. Since their feedback channel needs to be secure,
their setting is different from our case. Using the idea by
Maurer [12], our previous papers [10], [11], [25] proposed a
two-way protocol with noiseless public channel for Gaussian
BPSK channel. No paper studied the Poisson-channel case for
two-way protocol with noiseless public channel although this
model can be applied to the classical optimal communication.
In fact, Gaussian BPSK channel is a symmetric channel, but
Poisson channel is not symmetric. Hence, the protocol for
Gaussian BPSK channel [10], [11] cannot be directly applied
to our case. Using a different protocol, this paper resolves this
problem, and discusses how a two-way protocol with noiseless
public channel improves the secrecy capacity for Poisson
channels. Our improvement is much larger than that by use of
a pre-index channel in one-way protocol. Further, in our two-
way protocol, pre-index does not improve the secrecy capacity.
Since our protocol works without the positive information
difference condition for the wiretap channel and a noiseless
public channel allows any information leakage, it realizes the
secure communication even with the man-in-the-middle attack.
Notice that a noiseless public channel can be realized by
combination of an error correction and a conventional wireless
channel without any secrecy condition. Hence, the assumption
for a noiseless public channel is more realistic than that for
secure noiseless feedback.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL
Before our discussion of optical channel, we review funda-
mental knowledge for wiretap channel. The channel from the
legitimate transmitter (Alice) to the legitimate receiver (Bob)
is referred to as the “main” channel, and is considered to
be a memoryless channel characterized by input alphabet X,
output alphabet Y, a transition probability WY |X . The other
channel from Alice to a passive adversary (Eve) is referred
3to as the “eavesdropper’s channel”, and consists of another
memoryless channel characterized by input alphabet X, output
alphabet Z, and transition probability WZ |X . The pair of
channels (WY |X,WZ |X ) is called wiretap channel. We assume
that both the main and the eavesdropper channel are discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs) of WY |X and WZ |X . This model
supposes that the statistics of both channels are known to all
parties, and that authentication is already done1. Also, it is
assumed that Eve knows the coding scheme used by Alice
and Bob. For either channel model, the classic wiretap code
design goal is the simultaneous provision of reliability and
security and requires stochastic encoders. Then, the limit of
secure transmission rate is called the secrecy capacity Cs .
To handle Cs , we consider an additional system V and a
joint distribution pVX on V × X. Then, we have the joint
distributions pVXY := WY |XpXV and pVXZ := WZ |XpXV ,
on V × X × Y and V × X × Z, respectively. Under these
distributions, we have the mutual informations I(V ;Y ) and
I(V ; Z). Then, we have the formula for the secrecy capacity
Cs as [5]
Cs = max
pVX
(I(V ;Y ) − I(V ; Z))+ , (1)
where (a)+ is a for a positive number a and is 0 for a negative
number a. For example, there exists a channel WZ |Y such
that WZ |X = WZ |Y ◦WY |X , the wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X )
is called stochastically degraded. In this case, the secrecy
capacity Cs is written as follows [4].
Cs = max
pX
(I(X;Y ) − I(X; Z))+ . (2)
That is, we do not need to consider the additional variable V .
Further, when there exists a channel WY |Z such that WY |X =
WY |Z ◦WZ |X , we call the wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) anti-
stochastically degraded. In this case, the secrecy capacity Cs
is zero.
When the channels WY |X and WZ |X satisfy a certain sym-
metric condition, the maximum (1) is attained with the uniform
distribution in (2), and the secrecy capacity Cs can be attained
by a combination of randomized error correcting linear codes
and a random privacy amplification [28, Section V]. When the
maximum (2) is attained only by the non-uniform distribution
pX , we need to employ non-linear code to realize a code whose
transmission rate attains the capacity. Generally, it is quite hard
to implement such a non-linear code efficiently.
The same problem happen when we employ the formula
(1). To attain the mutual information rate I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z), we
apply the above discussion to the channels WY |V and WZ |V .
When the marginal distribution PV is uniform, the rate can
be attained by a combination of randomized error correcting
linear codes and a random privacy amplification. Otherwise,
we need to employ non-linear code to realize a code.
III. ONE-WAY PROTOCOL
A. Channel model
In this paper, as a typical channel model of the low-power
free space optical (FSO) channel using OOK modulation, we
1A small secret key is needed to authenticate the communication. It is
known that log n bits of secret are sufficient to authenticate n bits of data [26]
focus on wiretap Poisson channel. In OOK, we have the
binary input X , in which the “X = 0” is represented by zero
intensity and “X = 1” by positive intensity. This model has
the legitimate and the eavesdropper, which have the average
photon counting number λL
R |X=x and λ
E
R |X=x in the following
way when considering a binary modulation input random
variable X [29][30];
λLR |X=x = ξx + ζ, λ
E
R |X=x = γgpξx + γnpζ, (3)
where now the contributions to the average photon number
due to dark and/or light scattering currents are given as ζ
and γnpζ for the legitimate and the eavesdropper’s detectors,
respectively. Here, the coefficient γgp expresses the ratio of
the power of pulse received by the eavesdropper to that by
the legitimate. When both photo detectors have the same
performance, γnp can be regarded as 1. For example, when
the eavesdropper makes the man-in-the-middle attack, the
coefficient γgp is greater than 1.
TABLE I: Summary of parameters in wiretap Poisson channel
model
ξ
Signal contribution to legitimate’s
average photon counting number.
ζ
Dark and/or scattered light current contribution
to legitimate’s average photon counting number.
γnp
Eavesdropper’s noise coefficient in
terms of photon counting w.r.t. legitimate’s noise.
γgp
Eavesdropper’s channel attenuation coefficient in
terms of photon counting w.r.t. legitimate’s
channel attenuation coefficient.
We now denote the Poisson distribution of the random
variable Y with average photon counting λ by Pλ( ) defined as
Pλ(y) = e
−(λ)(λ)y
y! for y ∈ Z+. The received random variable at
the legitimate and eavesdropper’s receivers are denoted as Y
and Z , respectively whose probabilities are controlled by the
transition channel probabilities defined as
WY |X (y |x) = P(ξx+ζ )(y) = PλL
R |X=x
(y), (4)
WZ |X (z |x) = P(γgpξx+γnp ζ )(z) = PλE
R |X=x
(z). (5)
That is, when the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper use
the PNR detector, they observe Y and Z , respectively.
B. Protocol
In the one-way model, the secrecy capacity of a memoryless
wiretap channel is completely characterized as (1), which is
statistically described by the conditional distribution WYZ |X .
In the following we compute the secrecy capacity of the
optical Poisson channel based on the analysis on the conditions
of stochastic channel degradation. For the one-way protocol,
the legitimate receiver in (4) corresponds to Bob, and the
eavesdropper in (5) corresponds to Eve. A graphical model
of the information theoretical one-way optical channel for
Poisson distributed received signals according to (4) and (5)
is shown in Fig. 2. In the following, we assume two different
implementations of the photodetector.
4Fig. 2: Graphical model of the information theoretical one-
way optical channel for Poisson distributed received signals
according to (4) and (5). Note that the shown values are the
mean values of the Poisson distributions.
C. Bob and Eve use threshold detectors
When the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper use
threshold detector with the thresholds κ and κ′, respectively,
we denote the binary outcomes of the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper by Y ′ and Z ′, respectively. Then, by
using τ(ζ, κ) := e−ζ ∑κn=0 ζnn! , the transition channel for the
legitimate receiver is given as
P(Y ′ = 1|X = 0) = 1 − τ(ζ, κ),
P(Y ′ = 1|X = 1) = 1 − τ(ξ + ζ, κ),
P(Y ′ = 0|X = 0) = τ(ζ, κ),
P(Y ′ = 0|X = 1) = τ(ξ + ζ, κ).
(6)
The transition channel for the eavesdropper’s receiver is given
as
P(Z ′ = 1|X = 0) = 1 − τ(γnpζ, κ′),
P(Z ′ = 1|X = 1) = 1 − τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ′),
P(Z ′ = 0|X = 0) = τ(γnpζ, κ′),
P(Z ′ = 0|X = 1) = τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ′).
(7)
In particular, when the thresholds κ and κ′ are 0, threshold
detector equals on-off detector.
When the input X is subject to the binary distribution
(p, 1 − p) and the threshold of Bob’s detector is κ, the mutual
information between X and Y ′ is given as
I(ξ, ζ ; p)κ :=h(pτ(ζ, κ) + (1 − p)τ(ξ + ζ, κ))
− ph(τ(ζ, κ)) − (1 − p)h(τ(ξ + ζ, κ)). (8)
When κ = κ′ = 0, γgp ≤ 1, and γnp ≥ 1, our wiretap channel
(WY |X,WZ |X ) is stochastically degraded. Also, when κ = κ′
with general κ, γgp = 1, and γnp ≥ 1, our wiretap channel
(WY |X,WZ |X ) is stochastically degraded. (See Appendix A.)2.
2 When we apply the PNR detector, the condition for the stochastically
degraded property was discussed in [6][7, Lemma 1] However, when we
apply the threshold detector, we have different condition for the stochastically
degraded property. Hence, we need to consider this condition.
When our wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) is stochastically de-
graded, the secrecy capacity COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) is calculated
as follows.
COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) = maxp (Iκ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p))+, (9)
where the secrecy information rate Iκ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p) is
defined as
Iκ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p) := I(ξ, ζ ; p)κ − I(γgpξ, γnpζ ; p)κ′ . (10)
Conversely, when κ = κ′ = 0, γgp ≥ 1, and γnp ≤ 1, our
wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) is anti-stochastically degraded.
Also, when κ = κ′, γgp = 1, and γnp ≤ 1, our wiretap
channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) is anti-stochastically degraded. Hence,
the secrecy capacity COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) is zero.
When our wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) is not stochasti-
cally degraded nor anti-stochastically degraded, we need to
apply the general formula (1) instead of (2). That is, there is
a possibility that use of pre-index channel enhances secrecy
information rate. For this case, Endo et al. [9] restricted the
number |V| of elements of V to two in this setting when
κ = κ′ = 0, i.e., the case with the on-off detector. As shown
in Appendix B, when the number |X| of elements of X is
`, the maximum in (1) can be achieved with the case of
|V| = `. Given two probabilities p0, p1, p ∈ [0, 1], we choose
the distribution PV and the transition matrix PX |V to describe
a pre-index channel as
PX |V (0|i) = pi, PX |V (1|i) = 1 − pi
PV (0) = p, PV (1) = 1 − p.
(11)
Then, the mutual information is given as
I(ξ, ζ ; p0, p1, p)κ
:=h(pτ(ξ, ζ, κ, p0) + (1 − p)τ(ξ, ζ, κ, p1))
− ph(τ(ξ, ζ, κ, p0)) − (1 − p)h(τ(ξ, ζ, κ, p1)),
(12)
where τ(ξ, ζ, κ, pi) := piτ(ζ, κ) + (1 − pi)τ(ξ + ζ, κ). Hence,
the secrecy capacity COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) can be calculated as
follows.
COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) = maxp (I
imp
κ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p))+, (13)
where the improved secrecy information rate by pre-index
channel I impκ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p) is defined as
I impκ,κ′(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p)
:=max
p0,p1
I(ξ, ζ ; p0, p1, p)κ − I(γgpξ, γnpζ ; p0, p1, p)κ′ . (14)
D. Bob and Eve use PNR detectors
Next, we assume that Bob and Eve use a receiver with
the PNR detector. From a design point of view this is a
more expensive alternative if compared with the hard-detection
receiver. In this case, the detectors directly measure Y and Z
whose distributions are given in (4) and (5). Since the mutual
information between X and Y is H(Y )−H(Y |X), by cancelling
the factor log n!, it is calculated as the following quantity.
I(ξ, ζ ; p)PNR
:=h(ξ, ζ ; p)PNR − ph(ξ, ζ ; 1)PNR − (1 − p)h(ξ, ζ ; 0)PNR,
(15)
5where
h(ξ, ζ ; p)PNR := −
∞∑
n=0
pλn0 e
−λ0 + (1 − p)λn1 e−λ1
n!
· log(pλn0 e−λ0 + (1 − p)λn1 e−λ1 ),
where λ0 := ζ and λ1 := ξ + ζ .
When γgp ≤ γnp and γgp ≤ 1, our wiretap channel
(WY |X,WZ |X ) is stochastically degraded [6][7, Lemma 1].
Then, the secrecy capacity COWPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) is given as
follows.
COWPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) =maxp (IPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p))+, (16)
IPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p) :=I(ξ, ζ ; p)PNR − I(γgpξ, γnpζ ; p)PNR.
Conversely, when γgp ≥ γnp and γgp ≥ 1, WY |X can be
considered as stochastically degraded of the channel WZ |X .
Hence, the secrecy capacity COWPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) is zero.
When our wiretap channel (WY |X,WZ |X ) is not stochasti-
cally degraded nor anti-stochastically degraded, we need to
apply the general formula (1) instead of (2). For completion,
we have derived the corresponding expressions of secrecy
information rate and capacity as follows. For this case, given
two probabilities p0, p1, p ∈ [0, 1], the mutual information is
given as
I(ξ, ζ ; p0, p1, p)PNR :=h(ξ, ζ ; p0p + p1p)PNR − ph(ξ, ζ ; p0)PNR
− (1 − p)h(ξ, ζ ; p1)PNR, (17)
Hence, the secrecy capacity COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) can be calcu-
lated as follows.
COWPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) =maxp (I
imp
PNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p))+, (18)
where
I impPNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ ; p)
:=max
p0,p1
I(ξ, ζ ; p0, p1, p)PNR − I(γgpξ, γnpζ ; p0, p1, p)PNR.
In fact, when the legitimate and the eavesdropper’s detectors
have the same the dark and/or light scattering currents, i.e.,
γnp = 1, the paper [27], [7], [8] derived the secrecy capacity
as
COWPNR(γgp, 1|ξ, ζ) = maxp (g(ξ, 1 − p) − g(γgpξ, 1 − p))+, (19)
where
g(ξ, q) :=q(ξ + ζ) log(ξ + ζ) − (qξ + ζ) log(qξ + ζ)
+ (1 − q)ζ log ζ . (20)
IV. TWO-WAY PROTOCOL
A. Protocol
Similar to [12], this section considers two-way secure
communication protocol. Our two-way protocol for the optical
Poisson channel and OOK modulation can be described as
follows. In an initial step, Bob generates the binary variable
B ∈ F2 subject to the binary distribution (p, 1 − p), and sends
it to Alice, where 0 is generated with probability p. Hence,
the legitimate receiver in (4) corresponds to Alice, and the
eavesdropper in (5) corresponds to Eve. That is, Alice and Eve
obtain the variables Y ′ and Z ′, where Y ′ and Z ′ are subject
to the Poisson distribution PλL
R |B=b
and PλE
R |B=b
with
λLR |B=b = ξb + ζ ; λ
E
R |B=b = γgpξb + γnpζ . (21)
Here, when B is fixed to a certain value, Y ′ and Z ′ are assumed
to be independent.
Then, applying hard decision decoding to Y ′ based on
threshold detector with threshold κ, Alice obtains the binary
variable A. In the second round, Alice prepares another binary
variable X , and sends X ′ := X ⊕ A to Bob via a public channel
from Alice to Bob. When X is regarded as the channel input
information, the legitimate receiver’s output is B and X ′ while
the eavesdropper’s output is Z ′ and X ′. A graphical model of
the overall process along with the generated random variables
is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Graphical model of the information theoretical optical
two-way channel for Poisson distributed received signals ac-
cording to (4) and (5). Note that the shown values are the
mean values of the Poisson distributions.
B. Secrecy capacity when Eve uses threshold detector
In the case Eve uses threshold detector with threshold κ′
when receiving Z ′, Eve obtains the binary variable E . Then,
we obtain the Markov chain A − B − E . When Alice’s input
is X , Bob’s output is (B, X ′) and Eve’s output is (E, X ′).
Then, we have the wiretap channel (W(B,X′ |X),W(E,X′ |X)). As
discussed in [28, Eq. (22)], this channel can be regarded as a
symmetric channel. Hence, the secrecy capacity is achievable
by a combination of randomized error correcting linear codes
in a vector space over the finite field F2 and a random privacy
amplification [28, Section V] even when the binary distribution
(p, 1− p) of the variable B is not uniform. This is a big advan-
tage over the one-way protocol because the channel of our one-
way protocol is not symmetric, which implies that a non-linear
code is required to attain the capacity in general. Then, the
secrecy capacity equals the symmetric rate and is calculated
to I(A; B) − I(A; E) [28, Final equation in Section VI], which
6equals to the conditional mutual information I(A; B |E) due to
the Markov chain A− B− E and has the following expression
I(A; B |E)
=
1∑
e=0
PE (e)
(
h(PB |E (0|e)PA |B(0|0) + PB |E (1|e)PA |B(0|1))
− PB |E (0|e)h(PA |B(0|0)) − PB |E (1|e)h(PA |B(0|1))
)
. (22)
Choosing q¯0 := pτ(λER |B=0, κ′)+ (1− p)τ(λER |B=1, κ′), q¯1 := 1−
q¯0, p¯0 := pτ(λER |B=0, κ′)/q¯0, and p¯1 := p(1− τ(λER |B=0, κ′))/q¯1,
we have PE (e) = q¯e and PB |E (0|e) = p¯e. Hence, the
conditional mutual information is calculated as
CTWκ,κ′,p(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) :=
1∑
i=0
q¯i I(ξ, ζ ; p¯i)κ . (23)
In this setting, we can optimize the parameter p. Hence, the
optimum two-way secrecy capacity is
CTWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) := maxp C
TW
κ,κ′,p(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ). (24)
Since the analysis in [28] guarantees the strong security, our
protocol realizes the strong security with the above rate.
Remember that the parameter p expresses the distribution of
the variable B. One might consider that use of another variable
U connected to B as Fig. 4 improves the secrecy rate in a
way similar to Section III-C even in this case. However, the
Markov chain guarantees the relation I(A; B |E) ≥ I(A;U |E),
which shows that any pre-index channel does not improve the
performance of the two-way method.
Also, since I(A;U |E) = I(A;U) − I(A; E) ≥ I(U; A) −
I(U; E), we have
I(A; B |E) ≥ I(U; A) − I(U; E). (25)
Taking the maximum with respect to p, p0, p1, we have
CTWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) ≥ COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ). (26)
That is, the two-way method improves the one-way method
even when a pre-index channel is applied in the one-way
method.
BA E
U
Fig. 4: Markov chain.
C. Secrecy capacity when Eve uses PNR decision
Next, we consider the case when Eve uses the PNR detector.
Then, we obtain the Markov chain A − B − Z ′. When Alice’s
input is X , Bob’s output is (B, X ′) and Eve’s output is (Z ′, X ′).
Then, we have the wiretap channel (W(B,X′ |X),W(Z′,X′ |X)),
which is also a stochastically degraded channel. Similar to
the above case, the secrecy capacity is achievable by the same
way and is calculated to I(A; B) − I(A; Z ′) [28, Final equation
in Section VI], which equals to I(A; B |Z ′) due to the Markov
chain A − B − Z ′. This value is calculated as
CTWκ,PNR,p(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) :=
∞∑
n=0
qnI(ξ, ζ ; pn)κ, (27)
where qn := p
λE
R |B=0
n
n! e
−λE
R |B=0 + (1 − p)λ
E
R |B=1
n
n! e
−λE
R |B=1 , and
pn := p
λE
R |B=0
n
n! e
−λE
R |B=0/qn. In this setting, we can optimize the
parameter p. Hence, the optimum two-way secrecy capacity is
CTWκ,PNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) := maxp C
TW
κ,PNR,p(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ). (28)
Since E is obtained by application of the threshold detector
to the variable Z ′, we have I(A; Z ′) ≥ I(A; E), which implies
I(A; B) − I(A; Z ′) ≤ I(A; B) − I(A; E). Hence, we have
CTWκ,PNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) ≤ CTWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ). (29)
Therefore, CTWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ) is the largest among three
quantities CTW
κ,PNR(γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ), CTWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ), and
COWκ,κ′ (γgp, γnp |ξ, ζ).
V. COMPARISON
A. Comparison based on channel models (4), (5)
Now, using (13), (18), (24), and (28), all of these based
on the same wiretap channel model (4), (5), we compare
the one-way secure communication with on-off detection and
PNR detection and two-way secure communication with on-
off detection and PNR detection considering the asymmetric
direction of transmission because the performance of the two-
way secure communication depends on the property of the
initial optical Poisson channel. As a typical case of threshold
detector, we focus on on-off detection.
It is clear that the legitimate and the eavesdropper choose the
minimum value for their dark count rate among their choices
because smaller dark count rate improves their information
gain. That is, it is natural to fix γnp and ζ to be certain values.
The parameter γgp depends on the location of the eavesdrop-
per when the location of the legitimate signal receiver is fixed.
Hence, it cannot be controlled by the legitimate. Since the
eavesdropper may move, we consider that the parameter γgp
changes among a certain range. Since the parameter ξ depends
on the power of the signal, it is natural that the legitimate
signal transmitter can control ξ among a certain range. In this
case, even when other parameters γnp , γgp and ζ are fixed, it
is not so clear what amount is better for ξ.
For this comparison, we set γnp = 1, which means that
Eve’s detector has the same dark count rate as the detector
of the legitimate user. Then, if and only if γgp ≤ 1, the
channel is stochastically degraded. Otherwise, the channel is
anti-stochastically degraded. Hence, regardless of the value
of γgp , the one-way secrecy capacities COW0,0 (γgp, 1|ξ, ζ) and
COWPNR(γgp, 1|ξ, ζ) are calculated by (9) and (16), respectively.
That is, we do not need to optimize the additional parameter p0
and p1 related to the pre-index channel while such a type of
optimization is not needed in the two-way protocol. Hence,
if and only if γnp ≤ 1, both one-way secrecy capacities
have positive values. In contrast, the optimum of the two-way
7secrecy capacities CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|ξ, ζ) and CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|ξ, ζ) are
always positive.
In the following, we assume cheaper detector with dark
count rate ζ = 0.5 unlike the reference [9]. When the
eavesdropper makes the man-in-the-middle attack, the eaves-
dropper receives a stronger pulse than the legitimate. As a
typical case, we assume that the strength of the pulse received
by the eavesdropper is twice of that by the legitimate, i.e.,
γgp = 2. Then, we numerically calculate the two-way secrecy
capacity CTW0,PNR(2, 1|ξ, ζ) with PNR detection by varying ξ.
The optimum parameter for ξ is 1.35 as Fig. 5. In this case,
when ξ goes to infinity, we have
Pξ (A = 0|B = 0) = Pξ (E = 0|B = 0) = e−0.5,
lim
ξ→∞ Pξ (A = 0|B = 1) = limξ→∞ Pξ (E = 0|B = 1) = 0.
Hence, the capacity CTW0,0 (2, 1|ξ, 0.5) converges to the above
case. However, when Eve uses the PNR detector, Eve can
perfectly distinguish B = 0 or 1 under the limit ξ → ∞. In
this case, I(A; E) converges to I(A; B) under this limitation,
which implies the capacity CTW0,PNR(2, 1|ξ, 0.5) approaches to
zero.
Fig. 5: Two-way secrecy capacities when κ = 0, γnp = 1,
γgp = 2, and ζ = 0.5. The horizontal axis expresses ξ
and the vertical axis expresses the secrecy capacities. In
this case, one-way secrecy capacities are zero. Two-way
secrecy capacity CTW0,PNR(2, 1|ξ, 0.5) with PNS detector has
the maximum value when ξ = 1.35 while two-way secrecy
capacity CTW0,0 (2, 1|ξ, 0.5) with on-off detector is monotonically
increasing for ξ.
Then, we set ξ to be 1.35 while keeping γnp = 1 and
ζ = 0.5. Then, we numerically compare (13), (18), (24),
and (28), as Fig. 6. This comparison shows that the two-
way secrecy capacity CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) is larger than
the one-way secrecy capacity COW0,PNR(γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) when
γgp is larger than 0.5626 while the two-way secrecy capacity
CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) is always larger than the one-way se-
crecy capacity COW0,0 (γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5). Further, the difference
between CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) and CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) is
not so large. That is, even when the eavesdropper uses the PNR
detector, the power of the eavesdropper does not increase so
much.
Fig. 6: One-way and two-way secrecy capacities when κ =
κ′ = 0, γnp = 1, ζ = 0.5, and ξ = 1.35. The horizontal
axis expresses γgp and the vertical axis expresses the secrecy
capacities.
Next, since the parameter ξ is under the legitimate con-
trol and can actually have larger values, we now set ξ
to be 5 while keeping γnp = 1 and ζ = 0.5. Fig. 7
shows the numerical comparison of these four types of
secrecy capacities. This comparison shows that the two-
way secrecy capacity CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|5, 0.5) is larger than the
one-way secrecy capacity COW0,PNR(γgp, 1|5, 0.5) when γgp
is larger than 0.8014 while the two-way secrecy capacity
CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|5, 0.5) is always larger than the one-way secrecy
capacity COW0,0 (γgp, 1|5, 0.5). Further, the difference between
CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|5, 0.5) and CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|5, 0.5) is quite large.
From the numerical results shown in Figs. 6 and 7, we
observe that from the capacity point of view, when the detector
of the eavesdropper is the PNR detector, the choice between
using one-way or two-way schemes depends on the value of
γgp , i.e. on the assumption over the eavesdropper’s location.
On the other hand, the two-way secrecy capacity is always
better than the one-way secrecy capacity even with a pre-index
channel when the detector of the eavesdropper is the on-off
detector.
In the two-way scheme, we fix Bob’s detector to be the
threshold detector. Hence, the capacity with Eve’s threshold
detector is larger than the capacity with Eve’s PNR detector.
In the one-way scheme, we do not fixed Bob’s detector, which
is chosen to be the same type of Eve’s detector. That is,
when Eve uses PNR detector, Bob is assumed to use PNR
detector. Hence, there is no definitive relation between the
capacities with the PNR detector and the threshold detector.
The obtained numerical result shows that the capacity with the
PNR detector is larger than the capacity with the threshold
detector. Indeed, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob in the one-way case with the PNR detector (which is
denoted by IPNR(A; B)) is larger than that in other cases,
(which is denoted by ITHR(A; B)). Hence, when γgp is very
small, the information leaked to Eve is very small so that
8the mutual information between Alice and Bob is dominant.
In this case, the one-way capacity with the PNR detector is
close to IPNR(A; B) and other capacities are close to the same
value ITHR(A; B). Hence, the one-way capacity with the PNR
detector is larger than other capacities.
Fig. 7: One-way and two-way secrecy capacities when κ =
κ′ = 0, γnp = 1, ζ = 0.5, and ξ = 5. The horizontal
axis expresses γgp and the vertical axis expresses the secrecy
capacities.
It is also relevant to analyze the probabilities that
maximize the four capacities. We observe in Fig. 8 (a)
that when ξ = 1.35, ζ = 0.5 and γnp = 1, all the
optimal distributions (p, 1 − p) to achieve the secrecy
capacities CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5), COWPNR(γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5),
CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5), and COW0,0 (γgp, 1|1.35, 0.5) are
close to the uniform distribution. In contrast, when
ξ = 1.35 is changed to 5, Fig. 8 (b) shows the optimal
distribution (p, 1 − p) to achieve the secrecy capacities
CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|5, 0.5), COWPNR(γgp, 1|5, 0.5), CTW0,0 (γgp, 1|5, 0.5),
and COW0,0 (γgp, 1|5, 0.5). Hence, we confirm our conclusion
above that the best design choice is the two-way scheme
assuming Eve’s PNR detection, which also means to
engineer the transmission power of the pulse to maximize
CTW0,PNR(γgp, 1|ξ, ζ).
B. Choice of wiretap channel model for comparison
For the comparison between the one-way and two-way
regimes, we need to explain that the direction of secure
communication is not so important due the following reason.
First, we point out that in a real application, we usually need
secure communication in both directions. Second, the cost
of public channel is much smaller than the secure channel
in a usual case3. In this case, once we can realize secure
3Here, we briefly explain why the cost of a public channel is much smaller
than a secure channel. A public channel can be realized by conventional
wireless channel with error correction, where we do not care about its secrecy.
When we focus on the secrecy capacity to realize secure communication, we
need to control the strength power of the pulse to maximize the difference of
the mutual information. However, when using the public channel, we do not
need to care about the mutual information to the eavesdropper because we do
not care about its secrecy. Hence, we can make our pulse as strong as possible.
Therefore, the cost of public channel is almost negligible in comparison with
the cost of secure communication.
(a) ξ = 1.35
(b) ξ = 5
Fig. 8: Optimal distribution p for one-way and two-way
secrecy channel when κ = κ′ = 0, γnp = 1, ζ = 0.5 and
ξ = 1.35 or 5. The horizontal axis expresses γgp and the
vertical axis expresses the optimal distribution p.
communication from Alice to Bob, we can realize secure
communication from Bob to Alice by combining the public
channel from Bob to Alice and the secure random seed
transmitted from Alice to Bob via the secure communication
from Bob to Alice, which can be realized by use of Shannon’s
one-time pad secure communication. Therefore, it is sufficient
to establish secure communication with an easier direction.
That is, it is important to maximize secrecy capacity under
the assumption that we can freely use the public channel that
leads to optimal use of available system resources.
For example, we suppose that the wiretap channel from a
ground station to a satellite like Fig. 1 is much better than
the wiretap channel from the satellite to the ground station.
When we employ the one-way protocol, the secure information
transmission from the ground station to the satellite is much
easier than that from the satellite to the ground station.
Oppositely, when we employ the two-way protocol, the secure
communication from the satellite to the ground station is much
easier than that from the ground station to the satellite. In this
case, it is natural that we employ only the wiretap channel
from the ground station to the satellite. Now, we consider the
case that the ground station wants to send a secure message
to the satellite. When we use the one-way scheme, we can
9simply use a wiretap channel code for the wiretap channel
from the ground station to the satellite. When we use the two-
way scheme, the satellite securely transmits random seeds to
the ground station by using our two-way protocol. Then, the
ground station sends the secret message to the satellite by
combining the public channel and the secure random seed
transmitted from the satellite to the ground station. Hence,
in total we need three rounds of communication in this case.
In contrast, when we use the wiretap channel from the ground
station to the satellite and the satellite wants to send a secure
message to the ground station, the use of the one-way scheme
requires two rounds of communication totally as follows. In
this case, the ground station transmits random securely seeds
to the satellite by using the one-way protocol. Then, the
satellite sends the secret message to the ground station by
combining the public channel and the secure random seed
transmitted from the ground station to the satellite. Therefore,
when we employ the wiretap channel from the ground station
to the satellite, it is natural to compare the two-way secrecy
capacity from the satellite to the ground station with the one-
way secrecy capacity from the ground station to the satellite.
That is, when we compare the one-way and two-way secrecy
capacities, it is natural to focus on the same Poisson wiretap
channel.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS
In this paper, we have formulated the one-way and two-
way secrecy capacities for Poisson wiretap channel with two
types of detectors. In the first setting, the legitimate and the
eavesdropper are assumed to have a threshold detector. In the
second setting, the eavesdropper is assumed to have a PNR
detector. In this case, the legitimate is also assumed to have a
PNR detector in the one-way regime. However, in the two-way
regime, the legitimate is assumed to use a threshold detector
because we employ the same protocol in the two-way regime.
At the second round of the two-way regime, Alice sends the
exclusive or between the encoded information and the received
binary variable in the first round. Due to this construction,
we can achieve the secrecy capacity only with linear code
over the finite field F2, which is an advantage of the two-way
regime. When Bob uses a PNR detector, the secrecy rate can
be improved. However, this case requires more complicated
code construction.
Indeed, when the Poisson channel to the legitimate is a
degraded channel of the Poisson channel to the eavesdropper,
the one-way secrecy capacities are always zero. That is, a
secure communication is impossible in this case. Since the
above situation is natural in the man-in-the-middle attack,
the above impossibility is a serious defect. Fortunately, as
shown in this paper, the two-way secrecy capacities are always
positive unless the channel to the eavesdropper is noiseless. It
means that our two-way scheme brings us a secure commu-
nication even when the eavesdropper makes the man-in-the-
middle attack in the communication of the first round. Here,
the communication of the second round is treated as a public
channel. That is, we assume that the eavesdropper makes
the man-in-the-middle attack in the communication of the
second round. To clarify this advantage, we have numerically
compared these secrecy capacities. Our numerical comparison
shows drastic improvements by the two-way method when the
eavesdropper is more powerful than the legitimate.
In order to implement the proposed two-way method in a
real communication system, we need to perform finite-length
analysis for concrete code constructions. Such a discussion for
the Gaussian channel and BPSK modulation has already been
performed in the previous paper [31]. This type of analysis for
the proposed method for the Poisson channel is our ongoing
study. Further, our assumption for perfect Poisson channel
is ideal. In practice, the Photoelectric converter and post-
processing circuits are typically used, thus the distribution
of the received signal would be different from the Poisson
distribution [38], [39], [40]. An analysis on such a realistic
setting is also future study.
In addition, the obtained security does not depend on any
assumption for the calculation power of the computer because
the security analysis is ultimately based on the amount of
leaked information to the eavesdropper. Hence, the proposed
method works as post quantum cryptography. One might
consider whether our protocol keeps secrecy over active man-
in-the-middle attacks. Since active man-in-the-middle attacks
are allowed to modify the message transmission to the le-
gitimate, our two-way protocol cannot realize secrecy over
such an attack. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [32], [33]
covers secrecy even in this case. While the original QKD
protocol employs the single photon transmission, the decoy
QKD protocol [34], [35], [36], [37] offers the secrecy even
for the multiple-photon transmission by using many rounds of
communications via the public noiseless channel.
Indeed, one might consider that our two-way protocol is
too complicated for practical implementation. However, the
detector to be used in the two-way protocol is the threshold
detector, which can be the same as that for conventional
wireless communication. That is, since the average photon
number is not so small, the required photo detector has
low sensitivity (large dark count). The difference from the
conventional one-way protocol is the number of rounds. On the
other hand, the above decoy QKD protocol has a protocol that
is much more complicated than ours. Since the average photon
number is quite small, it also requires a special quantum
detector, i.e., a detector with high sensitivity (small dark
count), which is much more expensive. Hence, our additional
cost is almost negligible in comparison with the additional
cost of the above decoy QKD protocol. Therefore, under the
assumption of passive (not active) man-in-the-middle attack,
we have shown that our two-way protocol is more efficient
in the sense of cost effectiveness and can always be used to
complement other security protocols.
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APPENDIX A
STOCHASTICALLY DEGRADED CONDITION
Now, we consider the condition for stochastically degraded
property for the one-way case when the output systems of Bob
and Eve are composed a binary data. To consider this problem,
we consider a general binary wiretap channel model with Al-
ice’s binary input A, Bob’s binary output B, and Eve’s binary
output E . We set the parameters r0, r1, r2, r3 as WB |A(0|0) = r0,
WB |A(0|1) = r1, WE |A(0|0) = r2, and WE |A(0|1) = r3. Then,
the channel (WB |A,WE |A) is stochastically degraded if and
only if (r2, r3) is written as λ1(r0, r1) + λ2(1 − r0, 1 − r1) with
λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. This condition is equivalent to the condition
that (r2, r3) belongs to the tetragon spanned by (0, 0), (r0, r1),
(1, 1), and (1 − r1, 1 − r1) as Fig. 9. Assume that r0 ≥ r1 and
r2 ≥ r3. When r2 ≤ r0, the above condition is equivalent to
the condition r3r2 ≥
r1
r0
. When r2 ≥ r0, the above condition is
equivalent to the condition 1−r31−r2 ≤
1−r1
1−r0 . In our case,
r0 = τ(ζ, κ), r1 = τ(ξ + ζ, κ),
r2 = τ(γnpζ, κ′), r3 = τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ′).
Hence, the conditions r0 ≥ r1 and r2 ≥ r3 always hold.
0
3r
2r
(1,1)
0 1( , )r r
0 1(1 ,1 )r r− −
Fig. 9: Equivalent condition to stochastically degradedness;
(r2, r3) belongs to this tetragon.
Now, we consider the case when κ = κ′. In this case, τ(a, κ)
is monotonically decreasing for a. Hence, when γnp ≥ 1,
we have r2 ≤ r0. The above condition is equivalent to the
condition
τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ)
τ(γnpζ, κ) ≥
τ(ξ + ζ, κ)
τ(ζ, κ) . (30)
Especially, when γnp = 1, the above condition is simplified to
τ(γgpξ + ζ, κ) ≥ τ(ξ + ζ, κ). (31)
Since τ(a, κ) is monotonically decreasing for a, it is equivalent
to the condition γgp ≤ 1.
When γnp ≤ 1, we have r2 ≥ r0. The above condition
is equivalent to the condition (1 − τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ))/(1 −
τ(γnpζ, κ)) ≤ (1 − τ(ξ + ζ, κ))/(1 − τ(ζ, κ)), i.e.,
τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ) + τ(ζ, κ) − τ(γgpξ + γnpζ, κ)τ(ζ, κ)
≥τ(γnpζ, κ) + τ(ξ + ζ, κ) − τ(ξ + ζ, κ)τ(γnpζ, κ).
Next, we consider the case when κ = κ′ = 0, i.e., the case
with the on-off detector. Since τ(a + b, 0) = τ(a, 0)τ(b, 0), the
condition (30) under the condition γnp ≥ 1 can be simplified
to the condition τ(γgpξ, 0) ≥ τ(ξ, 0), i.e., γgp ≤ 1.
APPENDIX B
CARDINALITY OF AUXILIARY RANDOM VARIABLE
Here, we show that when the number |X| of elements of
X is `, the maximum in (1) can be achieved with the case
of |V| = `. Assume that |V| > ` and the cardinality of the
support of PV is greater than `. Then, there exists a joint
distribution PV,U on V×U such that the marginal distribution
of PV,U for V equals PV , the cardinality of the support of
PV |U=u is not greater than ` and
∑
v∈V PX |V (x |v)PV |U (v |u) =∑
v∈V PX |V (x |v)PV (v). We have
I(Y ;V) − I(Z;V) = H(Y ) − H(Z) − H(Y |V) + H(Z |V)
=H(Y ) − H(Z) −
∑
v∈V
PV (v)
(
H(Y |V = v) − H(Z |V = v))
=H(Y ) − H(Z)
−
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
PU (u)PV |U (v |u)
(
H(Y |V = v) − H(Z |V = v))
=
∑
u∈U
PU (u)
(
H(Y ) − H(Z)
−
∑
v∈V
PV |U (v |u)
(
H(Y |V = v) − H(Z |V = v)) )
=
∑
u∈U
PU (u)
(
H(Y |U = u) − H(Z |U = u)
− (H(Y |V,U = u) − H(Z |V,U = u)) )
=
∑
u∈U
PU (u)
(
I(Y ;V |U = u) − I(Z;V |U = u)
)
.
Therefore, there exists an element u ∈ U such that
I(Y ;V) − I(Z;V) ≤ I(Y ;V |U = u) − I(Z;V |U = u).
Since the cardinality of the support of PV |U=u is not greater
than `, we obtain the desired statement.
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